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The paper evaluates the differential performance of the six main types of Swedish programmes that 
were available to adult unemployed workers entitled to unemployment benefits in the 1990s: labour 
market training, workplace introduction, work experience placement, relief work, trainee replace-
ment and employment subsidies. On the basis of a large and particularly rich administrative dataset, 
propensity score multiple-treatment matching methods are applied to investigate the differential 
performance of the programmes both relative to one another and vis-à-vis more intense job search 
in open unemployment. Outcomes being assessed are short- and long-term employment rates as 
well as the probability of collecting unemployment benefits over time.  
Compared to waiting longer in open unemployment, all the programmes initially reduce their par-
ticipants’ employment probability in the short term (lock-in effect). Positive findings on more long 
term employment prospects are confined to job subsidies alone. Participation in trainee replacement 
makes no difference to deputies’ subsequent labour market outcomes. Individuals joining any of the 
remaining programmes later display either the same (workplace introduction) or lower employment 
rates coupled with a higher benefit collection probability than if they had searched further as openly 
unemployed. A likely factor behind these disappointing results is the use of such types of pro-
grammes simply as a way to re-qualify for unemployment benefits. As to the pair-wise comparison 
of the six programmes, the central finding is again that the more similar a programme is to a regular 
job, the higher the programme’s benefits to its participants, with employment subsidies by far the 
best performer, followed by trainee replacement. Several macroeconomic studies have however 
documented large and negative displacement and dead-weight effects for exactly these types of pro-
gramme, which highlights the difficult trade-off faced by labour market policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Sweden occupies a special place when it comes to labour market programmes: a long-
standing reliance on such measures has been accompanied by traditionally low unemploy-
ment rates by European standards, two features which several observers have often related 
to one another (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). 
The deep and sudden recession of the early 1990s has however posed new challenges to 
the Swedish labour market policy, when expenditure on the country’s extensive offer of 
labour market programmes reached 3 percent of GDP. Concomitantly, interest has been ris-
ing in evaluating how successful such large-scale measures have been. 
Sianesi (2002a) has for instance looked at the performance over the last decade of the 
Swedish system in its entirety, combining all the programmes into one and focusing in par-
ticular on the interactions between the unemployment benefit system and the programme 
system. The next natural step was to disaggregate the programme system into its main com-
ponents in order to take account of the fact that the core of the ‘Swedish model’ is an 
institutional environment where unemployed individuals can potentially choose among a 
wide array of options, each one aimed at improving their labour market opportunities in 
different ways. Some types of programmes provide direct incentives to move back into em-
ployment by either facilitating individuals’ job search, providing wage subsides or fostering 
the acquisition of work contacts and references; other measures by contrast provide incen-
tives to improve individual productivity and skills via formal training or work experience, 
thus expanding the range of work possibilities and making the working option more attrac-
tive. 
Different programmes may in fact differ in their effects, making it interesting to evaluate 
the relative effectiveness of the various measures, ideally aiming at identifying the best per-
forming ones. Such information could prove very useful not just for Swedish policy-makers 
and unemployed workers, but also for those countries who in the last two decades have 
been introducing or expanding their active labour market policy.
3 Although with obvious 
                                                 
3 Examples include the UK, where the ‘New Deal for the Young Unemployed’, introduced in April 1998 and 
sharing some of the features of the Swedish set-up, offers five types of ‘treatments’; France, where a series of 
measures targeted at unemployed youth were introduced during the late 80s; or Switzerland, where an ambi- 3
care, general lessons as to what type of programme is more effective can be cross-analysed 
and shared across countries (see e.g. Martin and Grubb, 2001). 
The present evaluation of the six main Swedish programmes that were available to adult 
individuals at the height of the economic recession in 1994 aims at complementing recent 
research being increasingly carried out in this direction.
4  
The differential performance of these programmes is investigated both relative to one 
another and vis-à-vis more intense job search in open unemployment. More precisely, the 
evaluation concerns the effect, for participants in a given programme, of joining that pro-
gramme compared to joining another available programme, as well as compared to waiting 
longer in open unemployment. 
When looking at the relative effectiveness of one programme compared to another, one 
needs to consider a group of unemployed job-seekers who, at least formally, could have 
chosen any of the measures under consideration. Focus of this analysis are individuals enti-
tled to unemployment benefits: they have exclusive access to some types of programmes 
and enjoy ‘special’ conditions on programmes of wider access (e.g. they are in principle 
granted the right to some types of programme when approaching benefit exhaustion). Spe-
cial policy interest in examining this group arises from the fact that one of the programmes 
was created just for entitled individuals, so that a natural question concerns the actual effec-
tiveness of this special measure. Furthermore, since up to February 2001 participation in a 
Swedish programme used to renew job-seekers’ eligibility to unemployment compensation, 
we are focusing on that one group whose participation incentives are most likely to have 
been affected and for whom the trade-off between productivity-enhancing components of 
                                                                                                                                                     
tious array of programmes was set up during the 90s. In fact, both at the OECD (OECD, 1996) and European 
Union (European Commission, 1998) level, labour market programmes are increasingly viewed as important 
measures to reduce long-term unemployment.  
4 Examples of microeconometric studies looking at the relative effects of Swedish programmes include Car-
ling and Gustafson (1999) for self-employment subsidies versus subsidised jobs, Frölich, Heshmati and 
Lechner (2000) and Melkersson (1999a, b) for programmes targeted at the disabled, Larsson (2000) for youth 
programmes, Johansson and Martinson (2000) for two types of labour market training programmes, and Car-
ling and Richardson (2001) for the relative efficiency of eight of the Swedish programmes. Evaluations of 
differential programme impacts outside the Swedish context include the recent work by Gerfin and Lechner 
(2000) for Switzerland and by Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2000) as well as Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon 
(1997) for France, and the earlier work by Ridder (1986) for the Netherlands.  4
the programmes and the reinforced work disincentive associated with the benefit system 
should have been at its sharpest. 
We consequently concentrate on two important types of outcomes. Given that an explicit 
aim of the active labour market policy is to improve the employability of unemployed 
workers, employment rates over time will be considered, summarising possible programme 
effects on both job finding probability and survival in employment once an occupation has 
been found. This will allow to address the issue of what type of programme – if any – is 
most beneficial to participants in terms of their employment prospects in the short and in 
the long run (five years). To capture the influence that benefit renewability considerations 
are likely to exercise on the impacts of the programmes, special attention is also devoted to 
the differential programme effects on individuals’ benefit collection probability over time.
5 
The next section outlines the Swedish labour market policy and describes the six pro-
grammes being evaluated. Section 3 describes data and sample choice and offers a ‘naïve’ 
first evaluation of the programmes based on the raw data. Section 4 highlights the evalua-
tion problem in a multiple-treatment framework and how it has been addressed in the 
Swedish context, as well as discussing the plausibility of the underlying identifying as-
sumption. Section 5 presents the findings, before concluding in Section 6 with a summary 
and overall appraisal of the results. 
 
 
2.  The Swedish labour market policy 
The Swedish labour market policy has two components: a benefit system that supports in-
dividuals while unemployed and various active labour market programmes offered in order 
to facilitate the re-employment of unemployed job seekers. 
Unemployment compensation is provided in two forms
6, the most important one being 
unemployment insurance (UI). UI benefits are very generous by international standards – 
                                                 
5 We do not consider differential programme effects on wages or earnings. Although this would provide inter-
esting information on potential programme effects on individual productivity, as highlighted by Carling and 
Richardson (2001) increased income has never been an explicit objective of the Swedish labour market pol-
icy; programmes have by contrast traditionally represented a measure to keep a compressed wage structure. 
6 Individuals not entitled to any form of unemployment benefits may receive means-tested social insurance.  5
the income-related daily compensation is 80 percent of the previous wage
7 – and are avail-
able for a long duration – 60 calendar weeks. An (even part-time) unemployed person reg-
istered at a public employment office and actively searching for a job is eligible for unem-
ployment benefits if in addition to a membership condition
8, the work condition is satisfied: 
the claimant must have been working for at least five months during the twelve months pre-
ceding the current unemployment spell. In addition, an offer of ‘suitable’ work – or of a 
labour market programme – must be accepted; refusal to accept a job/programme might 
lead to expulsion from compensation. 
The second form of unemployment compensation is cash labour market assistance 
(KAS). This supplementary compensation system, mainly designed for new entrants in the 
labour market who usually are not members of any UI fund, is roughly half as generous as 
UI, both in terms of amount and duration of benefits. Claimants are subject to a work con-
dition similar to the one for UI, which can however be replaced by the education condition 
of having finished at least one year of school in excess of the nine compulsory ones. 
The passive and active components of the Swedish labour market policy used to be 
closely linked: up to February 2001, participation in a labour market programme for five 
months (or completion of a training course) would count as employment and thus qualify 
for a renewed spell of unemployment compensation. Consequently, in spite of the period 
during which an unemployed job-seeker can receive unemployment benefits being fixed, it 
used to be in fact possible to extend it indefinitely by using programme participation to re-
new eligibility. 
The stated overall purpose of the Swedish labour market programmes is to prevent long 
periods out of regular employment and to integrate unemployed and economically disad-
vantaged individuals into the labour force. There are various kinds of programmes avail-
able, some specifically targeted at particular groups, such as the young or the disabled, 
while the rest open to anyone registered at an employment office. 
                                                 
7 This maximum level of compensation has changed a few times during the 1990s; note also that the system 
has a ceiling in terms of the amount of daily compensation. 
8 The claimant must have paid the membership fees to the UI fund for at least 12 months prior to the claim 
Though low in absolute terms, fees vary considerably between UI funds reflecting unemployment differen-
tials between industries and occupations covered by the funds (e.g. in 1986, the yearly fee ranged from SEK 
60 to 550, with the average hourly wage rate for manufacturing workers at SEK 55).  6
This evaluation focuses on the six main programmes open to adult unemployed workers 
in the middle of the 90s: labour market training, workplace introduction, work experience 
placement, relief work, trainee replacement and employment subsidies.
9 
To gain access to any programme, one needs to be registered at a local official employ-
ment office. The six programmes under consideration are additionally open to adults only 
(over 20 or 25), while work experience placement requires the individual to be entitled to 
unemployment compensation, and employment subsidies are targeted at the long-term un-
employed. The latter may often be regarded as a mere guideline, though, since 20 percent 
of the employment subsidy participants in our data have spent less than the required six 
months in open unemployment prior to joining.
10 All the individuals in our chosen sample 
satisfy the eligibility rules in terms of registration, age and entitlement criteria, while we 
shall control very carefully for unemployment duration prior to programme start.  
Whilst on a programme, participants either receive the stipulated wage and other bene-
fits on their ‘temporary’ workplace, or the equivalent of the unemployment benefit they 
would have enjoyed as openly unemployed. Most programmes have a maximum duration 
of six months (under special circumstances renewable for another six), though participants 
stay an average of four to five months.  
Table 2.1 contrasts the main features of the programmes being evaluated.  
Labour market training (AMU), by far the most expensive measure, is intended to aug-
ment participants’ human capital with formal, full-time vocational
11 teaching of new skills.  
A second type of programme offers workplace traineeship to maintain and enhance con 
tact with working life and gain practical experience, good working habits and references 
                                                 
9 Two programmes are excluded from the analysis on the basis that they are targeted to (or attract) quite spe-
cific sub-groups of unemployed individuals: self-employment grants (for individuals wishing to establish their 
own new business, with both a business idea and a financial plan approved by the offices) and vocational re-
habilitation (for persons with occupational disabilities needing specialised resources for in-depth counselling 
and job-preparation measures). Findings by Carling and Richardson (2001) do in fact support the view that 
participants in self-employment grants may have better employment prospects due to unobserved characteris-
tics than participants in the other programmes. 
10 Larsson (2000) finds the waiting period rule to be de facto regarded as a formal requirement for youth prac-
tice too. 
11 To reduce the heterogeneity in courses offered, the focus of this evaluation is on vocational training. Like 
Carling and Richardson (2001), we exclude participants in non-vocational courses, which are aimed at help-
ing workers with basic educational insufficiencies to move on to further education or to other programmes, 
rather than directly into a job.  7
from which to later benefit on the regular labour market. Work experience placement 
(ALU) was introduced at the deepening of the recession in 1993 with the explicit aim to 
prevent entitled individuals from exhausting their benefits. In fact, individuals need to be 
eligible to either UB or KAS to participate in this scheme, which can involve almost any 
kind of activity (the most frequent tasks being in administration and construction). Work-
place introduction (API), which replaced a number of older job-experience programmes, 
offers unemployed individuals a period of workplace training. 
A third kind of measure provides unemployed workers with a temporary job. Relief work 
involves specially created temporary jobs, mostly in the public sector. Though relief work 
is the oldest measure (dating back to 1933) for creating employment, it has diminished in 
importance during the 1990s, now being primarily used for individuals at risk of losing 
their unemployment benefits (Swedish Institute, 1997); in particular, unemployed UI fund 
members who run out of compensation are in principle granted the right to a relief job. In a 
trainee replacement scheme, an unemployed individual replaces a regularly employed 
worker who is on leave for education. This measure thus allows an unemployed worker to 
acquire valuable work experience, while creating an opportunity for firms to update the 
skills of their employees. 
Finally, employment subsidises not only represent a temporarily subsidised job opportu-
nity to acquire job-specific human capital, but they are aimed at influencing an employer’s 
hiring process: the engagement is implicitly expected to continue after completion of the 
programme.  
Thus while all the programmes aim at improving participants’ employment prospects, 
two important dimensions that distinguish the various types is the kind of skills provided 
and the way they are provided. At the one end of the spectrum, labour market training pro-
vides vocational classroom training of new skills deemed in demand. API has a strong em-
phasis on practical vocational training; similarly, ALU and relief work may provide partici-
pants with job experience and improve their working habits. Participants in these three 
kinds of programme are however prevented – at least formally – from performing tasks that 
a regularly employed individual would otherwise do. Although it is likely for such a rule to  8
be often interpreted more as a recommendation than as a strict guideline
12, to the extent it is 
adhered to, the type of on-the-job practice acquired may not be expected to be particularly 
marketable. 
Like the two work practice schemes and relief work, trainee replacement and employ-
ment subsidies offer the opportunity to invest in job-specific human capital; in these cases, 
though, the participant does in fact replace ordinary labour. Finally, while trainee replace-
ment – a deputyship for the employee on study leave – is intrinsically a temporary opportu-
nity to gain job-specific experience, employment subsidies, with the implicit agreement that 
the employer will then hire the individual on a regular and indefinite basis, almost entail the 
‘promise’ of a permanent job.  
A final consideration relates to the first row in Table 2.1, which highlights that in Swe-
den the state to which programme participants can be compared to is not one of being com-
pletely left on one’s own to look for a job, but the baseline ‘package’ offered by the em-
ployment offices. An individual registered as openly unemployed has access to various em-
ployment services, not only in terms  of  the increasingly computerised job information and 
matching of vacancies to applicants, but also in terms of the ‘job-seeker activities’, which 
include search-skill-enhancing activities such as training courses on how to apply for a job 
and motivation-raising activities. In some countries this kind of assistance is in fact consid-
ered a programme in its own right.
13 
                                                 
12 Circumstantial evidence in Hallström (1994; reported in Ackum Agell, 1995) shows that all parties in-
volved (sponsors, participants and the employment officers) believe that these projects often do replace jobs 
that are part of the organisers’ normal activity. 
13 An example is the Gateway period of the new UK New Deal programme for the unemployed.  9
Table 2.1 Synoptic table of the main features of the programmes  
PROGRAMME  AIM  ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER  TRAINING  TASK  COMPENSATION




fill job openings quickly, job search 
assistance and training  
    job seeker activi-
ties  





equip individuals with skills to find jobs 
more easily 
>20  priv. and publ. 
providers 
vocational class-




WORK PRACTICE             
Work experience 
placement (ALU) 
prevent exhaustion of benefits while 
maintaining contact with the regular 





90% public and 
non-profit 
 otherwise  not 
performed 
TA/BA free  labour  9,294
Workplace  
introduction (API) 
contact with working life to get work-
place training, job-experience and refer-
ences   
≥ 20  private and public  practical voca-
tional training  
otherwise not 
performed 




TEMPORARY JOB              
Relief  work  specially created temporary jobs to 
maintain working skills and habits, also 
to avoid benefit exhaustion 
 
 









grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 7,000/month)
9,201 
Trainee replacement  enhance skills of employee while pro-
viding an unemployed individual with 
work experience in a regular job 
≥ 20  80% in public 
sector 





grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 
7,000/month); deduction of train-
ing costs; educational grant of up 












only; from 97 
some industries 
excluded 






grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 7,000/month)
5,968 
Notes: Information has been gleaned from various sources, in particular, Swedish Institute (1997). 
a TA is training allowance equivalent to the UI or KAS 
the individual would have been entitled to; BA is the basic amount (SEK 103 per day) if the individual is not entitled. 
 b Total monthly cost per participant 
(SEK); such information is from AMS (1998) and has been taken from Carling and Richardson (2001, Table 1).  10
3.  Data, sample selection, and a preliminary look 
at the raw data 
The dataset constructed to capture the institutional framework just described is the result of 
combining two main sources, which reflect the programme component (Händel) and the 
benefit component (Akstat) of the labour market policy. Händel, the unemployment register 
maintained by the National Labour Market Board (AMS), contains information on all un-
employed individuals registered at the public employment offices. Available from 1991, it 
provides each individual’s labour market status information over time, together with impor-
tant characteristics of the job-seeker and of the occupation sought. Akstat, available from 
1994, originates from the unemployment insurance funds and records information – in par-
ticular on unemployment benefit receipt, previous wage and working hours – for individu-
als who are entitled to UI or KAS. 
As to sample choice, we need individuals who are homogeneous in those basic charac-
teristics which determine eligibility to the programmes under examination. Only then will it 
be relevant to examine their outcomes had they chosen a competing type of programme. As 
motivated in the previous sections, the choice of this paper is to focus on adult individuals 
entitled to unemployment benefits. An additional advantage compared to non-entitled indi-
viduals is in terms of data quality and availability: since registration at an employment of-
fice is a pre-requisite for drawing benefits, our chosen sub-sample is a particularly repre-
sentative one of the sub-population of interest. The information for benefit recipients is thus 
especially reliable, but also much richer, since it includes all the information from the Ak-
stat dataset. 
A sample of over 30,800 adult individuals has thus been selected who entered the em-
ployment offices for their first time
14 and in the same calendar year 1994 (when unem-
ployment was still at its highest), registered as openly unemployed
15 and were entitled to 
either UI or to KAS. Additionally, individuals whose first programme was start-up grants, 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, one cannot exclude that our individuals have had contact with the unemployment office 
before August 1991, date when Händel starts. 
15 In particular, given that the main purpose of the programmes is to enhance the re-employability of the un-
employed, those registering as employed or directly entering as programme participants (possibly anticipating 
a risk of unemployment) are excluded from the sample.  11
vocational rehabilitation or non-vocational training are dropped from the analysis (see foot-
notes 9 and 11). Our individuals, all in the 25-54 age group and with no occupational dis-
abilities, are then followed until the end of November 1999.
16 
An exploratory first look at the raw data allows one to gather a general idea of the paths 
participants in the various programmes follow after their respective programme. A few in-
teresting features emerge from Table 3.1, showing the share of each type of participant 
moving on to a different labour market state directly after the programme. The exceptional 
performance of employment subsidies jumps to the eye: three quarters of participants di-
rectly after programme completion exit the unemployment register, and practically all for a 
regular job. The ranking of the various other programmes, lagging far behind and with re-
placement schemes as second best, is in line with a priori expectations about the degree of 
relevance of the experience gained on the programmes. If we accept that after such schemes 
participants would often need to spend some time job-seeking, the superiority of replace-
ment schemes remains, although training now also performs quite well. Quite interestingly, 
a large fraction of former participants (around a third of the remaining unemployed pool) 
return to the same kind of programme. 
After this crude ‘tracking’ of participants’ early moves, the raw data can be further ex-
plored by looking at employment rates over time for participants in the six programmes, 
starting from the moment they join and following them up to five years. The raw differen-
tial outcomes visualised in Figure 3.1 again clearly confirm the ‘star’ performance of em-
ployment subsidies. Still in line with a priori expectations, the second-best performer ap-
pears to be trainee replacement. It is interesting to note that labour market training, though 
not one of the best performing measures in the short-term, seems to catch up later on: em-
ployment rates of former trainees equal if not surpass those of former participants in re-
                                                 
16 Some minor adjustments have been made to the data to deal with negative or short spells. As to negative 
durations, after correcting what clearly appeared to be mistakes, the history of the remaining 5700 individuals 
involved has been deleted from one spell before the negative one onwards. As to spells shorter than one week, 
two adjacent unemployment spells separated by a short break have been merged into one long spell. A similar 
adjustment has been made when an individual’s first period of registration at the employment office is a short 
non-unemployment spell immediately followed by an unemployment spell. Finally, an individual’s first pro-
gramme shorter than a week and followed by another programme was merged to that subsequent programme.  12
placement schemes. API and ALU seem to perform roughly equally well, with API offering 
slightly better outcomes in the short term.  
Table 3.1 Transitions from the first programme onwards (% of respective participants) 
  Type of programme 
 Train-
ing 




Number of participants  1,387 2,983 425 654 483  426
(as percent of participants)  (21.8) (46.9) (6.7) (10.3) (7.6)  (6.7)
Participants who directly after the programme (UP)
a 
(a) found employment  8.9 11.3 14.3 15.3 22.5  72.8
(b) other exit 
b 2.0 2.6 3.8 6.6 5.6  2.6
Out of those who after the programme fell back into unemployment (UPU)
a, then: 
(a) found employment   29.5 23.8 25.0 35.4 47.1  42.0
(b) other exit 
b 10.9 14.3 18.2 12.2 14.6  18.0
(c) same type of programme   27.5 35.4 34.8 16.7 21.4  8.0 
Notes: 
a U: open unemployment spell; P: first programme spell, i.e. the respective ‘treatment’. 
b exit from the 
labour force (including for regular education) or de-registered for ‘contact lost’.  
 
Figure 3.1 Raw data: employment probability over time, by type of first programme  
































This simple picture emerging from the raw data, though interesting and in line with ex-
pectations, cannot however be taken as showing the causal effects of the programmes. Such 
differential performance may be wholly or partially attributable to a selection effect: indi-
viduals going into the different programmes are likely to systematically differ in terms of 
characteristics that also influence their labour market performance. Visual inspection of se- 13
lected average characteristics in Table 3.2 clearly shows that participants in the different 
programmes are not a random sample from the population, but are in fact quite distinctive 
groups. There seem to be several variables – such as skills, qualifications and employment 




4.  Methodology 
4.1  The evaluation problem in a multiple-treatment framework  
In the prototypical evaluation problem, the effect on some outcome of a single ‘treatment’ 
of interest is assessed relative to another comparison treatment (the latter generally corre-
sponding to the non-administration of the treatment of interest).  
When it comes to the evaluation of a country’s active labour market policy, however, the 
‘treatment’ is no longer homogeneous, but is made up of various kinds of programmes 
which may well differ in terms of their effects on the outcome of interest. In such a context, 
a natural question arises as to the relative effectiveness of the different types of measures. 
This sub-section sketches the framework recently developed by Imbens (2000) and 
Lechner (2001), which generalises Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) potential outcome ap-
proach for the case of a single treatment to the case where a whole range of treatments is 
available.  
More precisely, let a set of K+1 different kinds of mutually exclusive treatments
17 be 
available to any given individual. As a concrete example, the choice set of an unemployed 
individual may contain K types of programmes as well as a ‘no-programme’ option.  
 
                                                 
17 Or equivalently, in a dose-response model, the treatment of interest is allowed to take on integer values 
between 0 and K.  14
Table 3.2 Selected individual descriptive statistics, by type of exit from first open unemployment spell 
  Programme participants  Exits from unemployment 
 Train-
ing 










Age at entry (years)  38 41 37 40 38  39  38 35 33 37
Gender (% female)   43.5 43.7 50.4 26.8 79.3  33.8 47.0 77.4 66.2 49.4
Foreign (%)  6.1 7.4 21.2 9.2 3.7  4.7 4.6 7.1 5.9 10.2
Education (%): compulsory  29.6 33.5 35.3 33.5 18.0  32.6 26.0 24.9 22.2 30.4
   vocational upper secondary  53.2 41.1 35.3 50.3 48.9  47.4 45.3 45.0 41.2 39.5
   University  8.5 17.6 22.1 9.0 26.7  12.9 22.3 19.7 19.8 20.9
Educat. for job sought (% yes)  64.5 64.5 59.1 66.8 77.4  67.6 73.4 67.8 54.6 64.4
Experience (%): some  9.8 12.0 15.5 11.8 17.0  12.7 11.5 15.2 19.6 14.2
                           good  83.6 79.9 64.2 82.7 71.6  83.1 82.7 76.2 59.3 77.9
KAS (%)  5.8 6.3 13.6 14.8 5.2  12.7 8.2 6.1 6.1 15.8
Previous wage (SEK, daily)  641 667 602 665 555  647 665 591 587 617
Prev. working hours (% 40)  84.0 83.1 79.8 86.2 67.7  87.6 81.1 75.2 72.6 76.7
Sector (%)    
   admin., manag. and clerical   19.8 16.5 18.1 6.4 8.7  16.4 13.4 17.6 16.2 12.0
   sales  12.0 13.5 15.1 9.0 5.2  23.0 10.5 13.6 10.6 12.6
   production   31.5 25.2 18.6 48.9 6.0  22.5 26.2 11.0 11.0 18.9
   services  10.2 10.1 14.6 9.9 9.1  8.9 9.6 13.6 9.6 15.0
Looks for part-time job (%)  3.9 6.5 5.6 4.0 9.7  4.2 7.2 11.9 6.7 7.8
Part-time unemployment (%)  11.5 12.3 22.1 7.3 35.4  15.5 33.2 36.6 21.4 38.3
Needs guidance (%)  16.8 11.4 19.5 10.6 4.6  7.7 3.3 6.6 6.4 5.9
Unempl. duration (days)  232 349 507 277 217  319 249 329 208 413
Observed days on programme   116 148 141 137 125 146
Number 1,387 2,983 425 654 483  426 15,972 2,680 2,456 2,739
Percent of total (= 30,863)  4.5 9.7 1.4 2.1 1.6  1.4 51.8 8.7 8.0 8.9 15
Interest lies in the causal average effect of a treatment relative to another treatment on 





k denoting the outcome Y for individual i, if i were to re-
ceive treatment k. Let T∈ {0, 1, …, K} denote the actual assignment to a specific treatment, 
so that Ti=k if individual i receives treatment k. Since each individual receives only one of 
the treatments, his remaining K potential outcomes are unobserved counterfactuals.  
Note that for this representation to be meaningful, the stable-unit-treatment-value 
(SUTVA)
18 assumption has to be fulfilled, requiring treatment status as well as all the po-
tential outcomes of a given individual to be independent from the treatment status of others, 
the latter condition ruling out the possibility of general equilibrium or cross-effects. 
A number of interesting parameters can now be defined (see Lechner, 2001), but in what 
follows, the focus will be on the generalisation of the popular ‘effect of treatment on the 
treated’: the (K+1)• K pair-wise comparisons of the average effect of treatment k relative to 
treatment k’ conditional on assignment to treatment k, for all combinations of k and k’: 
E(Y
k–Y
k’|T=k)  = E(Y
k|T=k) – E(Y
k’|T=k)   for k, k’∈ {0, 1, …, K},  k≠ k’.
19 
In our case, this amounts to assessing the average effect for an individual registering as 
unemployed in Sweden of participating in programme k compared to a hypothetical state in 
which he received treatment k’. 
The first term, the average outcome following treatment k for individuals who have par-
ticipated in k, is observed in the data. This is however not the case for all the counterfactu-
als of the type E(Y
k’|T=k), i.e. all the outcomes participants in k would have experienced, on 
average, had they taken any treatment other than k. 
Identifying assumptions thus need to be invoked to overcome the fundamental missing 
data problem that since no individual can be in more than one state at the same time, all but 
one of the K+1 potential outcomes are not observed for any given individual.
20 One such 
                                                 
18 First expressed by Rubin (1980) and further discussed in Rubin (1986) and Holland (1986). 
19 Note that in general this parameter is not symmetric: E(Y
k–Y
k’|T=k) ≠  –E(Y
k’–Y
k|T=k’) if participants in the 
two programmes systematically differ in characteristics related to the outcome. 
20 Identification assumptions and estimation of treatment effects in non-experimental studies have been exten-
sively looked at. Standard references in the evaluation literature include the comprehensive survey by Heck-
man, LaLonde and Smith (1998), as well as Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997,  16
assumption often invoked in evaluation exercises is the conditional independence assump-
tion (CIA), an extension of which would allow us to identify all the counterfactuals:
21 
T ⊥  (Y
0, Y
1, …, Y
K) | X=x, ∀  x∈ C* 
This identifying assumption (termed ‘strong unconfoundedness’ by Imbens, 2000) re-
quires the existence of a set of observable characteristics X (variables unaffected by the 
treatments, defined as ‘attributes’ by Holland, 1986) such that, conditional on their values 
x, the treatment indicator T is independent of the entire set of potential outcomes (over the 
set C* of X values for which the treatment effect is defined).  
Note however that a weaker form would in fact suffice to identify the conditional treat-
ment effects we are interested in:
 22 
T ⊥  (Y
k, Y
k’) | X=x, ∀  x∈ C* , T∈ {k, k’} for  k, k’∈ {0, 1, …, K},  k>k’   (*) 
Since we are just interested in the pair-wise comparison of the various kinds of treat-
ments, we can relax strong unconfoundedness by requiring conditional independence to 
hold only for the sub-populations receiving either treatment k or treatment k’ (see Lechner, 
2001): all the (outcome-relevant) differences between individuals choosing treatment k and 
those selecting into treatment k’ need to be captured by variables the evaluator can control 
for.  
The unobserved counterfactuals can thus be identified as: 
E(Y
k’|T=k) = EX [E(Y
k’|T=k, X)|T=k] = EX[E(Y
k |T=k’, X)|T=k] 
where the inner expectation is identified due to CIA (*) and the outer expectation is 
taken with respect to the distribution of X for participants in k. 
The latter highlights how in order to adjust for differences in X, sufficient overlap is re-
quired in the distribution of X by treatment status. In particular, all participants in k need to 
have a counterpart in the k’-group for each X for which we seek to make a comparison. If 
there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for the two groups, matching has 
                                                                                                                                                     
(1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) and Rubin 
(1974). 
21 Its weaker form in terms of conditional mean independence would suffice. 
22 Again, the requirement could just be in terms of conditional mean independence.  17
to be performed over the common support region
23; the estimated treatment effect has then 
to be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated k falling within the common 
support.
24  
Formally, define the (generalised) propensity score as the conditional probability of re-
ceiving a given type of treatment given X:  
P
k(X) ≡  Pr(T=k|X) 
The common support requirement for all pair-wise conditional parameters then trans-
lates into: 
0 < P
k(X) < 1  for X∈ C*  and  k=0, 1, …, K. 
25 
 
An important practical result by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for the single treatment 
case (T∈ {0,1}) is that the propensity score P(T=1|X), a single variable giving the probabil-
ity of being treated conditional on X, provides a parsimonious way to adjust for differences 
in a (generally large) set of pre-treatment characteristics between treatment and non-
treatment groups, formally:  T ⊥  X | P(T=1|X). 
More generally, a balancing score b(X) is a function of X, such that conditional on it, the 
characteristics X are ‘balanced’ across the treatment groups, i.e. T ⊥  X | b(X). A necessary 
and sufficient condition for a function of X to be a balancing score is to be at least as fine as 
the (generalised) propensity score P
k(X):
26 
E[Pr(T=k|X)|b(X)] = Pr(T=k|X) ≡  P
k(X) 
0< P
k(X) <1,   for k=0, 1, …, K. 
Since we are however just interested in the separate pair-wise comparisons of the vari-
ous treatments, we need to find a balancing score ensuring the balancing of the X’s in the 
two sub-populations of interest for each separate comparison, say for k and k’: 
T ⊥  X | b(X), T∈ {k, k’} 
                                                 
23 Alternatively, identification would rely on (parametrically) extrapolating from regions of C* that have posi-
tive probabilities for both the treatment states being compared to occur. 
24 Note that if the treatment effect varies among individuals, restricting to the common subset may actually 
change the parameter being estimated. 
25 To just compare treatment k with k’ for participants in k, one would need to have some participants in k’ 
with those X’s at which there are participants in k, i.e. P
k’(X)>0 ∀ X∈ C*: P
k(X)>0. 
26 Cf. Theorem 2 by Rosenabaum and Rubin (1983) and proposition 1 in Lechner (2001).  18
which is verified iff  




In our case of separate pair-wise comparisons of the various treatments, the conditioning 
variable (balancing score) of minimal dimension which ensures the balancing of observ-
ables in the two sub-populations of interest k and k’ is thus still given by a scalar, the condi-
tional choice probability of treatment k given either treatment k or k’:
 27 
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One way to apply such results is to control for systematic differences between treatment 
groups’ observed characteristics by matching participants in k to individuals receiving 
treatment k’ based on a balancing score b(X). For any pair of treatments k and k’, under the 
CIA assumption that all the outcome-relevant differences between the two groups are cap-
tured by their observable characteristics, the average outcome experienced by the matched 
pool of k’-participants thus identifies the counterfactual outcome participants in k would 
have experienced, on average, had they taken treatment k’ instead. 
 
4.2  Multiple-treatment matching in the Swedish institutional set-
up 
An important initial clarification concerns the definition of the ‘no-programme’ state in 
Sweden.
28 In general, sooner or later an unemployed individual will go on a programme, 
provided he remains unemployed ‘long enough’. In other words, if unemployed individuals 
in Sweden are not observed to go into a programme, it can be argued that it is because they 
have found a job (before). Using as no-programme group those individuals who are ob-
served not to enter any programme (thus de facto observed to leave the unemployment reg-
ister) would a priori set programme participants at a disadvantage.  
                                                 
27 Cf. also Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2000). 
28 The discussion of an absent 'non-treatment' group was initiated by Carling and Larsson (2000a, b).  19
A connected important feature in the programme selection process in Sweden is the fact 
that unemployed job-seekers and case-workers are most likely to take their decisions se-
quentially over time in unemployment. In particular, at any given moment the relevant de-
cision is between joining a programme now or not participating for now, in the knowledge 
that one can always join later on. The key choice faced by the unemployed in Sweden is 
thus a decision between either participating in a programme now or else searching longer in 
open unemployment whilst availing themselves of the services offered by the employment 
offices. Correspondingly, when looking at the inflow into unemployment, a natural parame-
ter to evaluate in the Swedish institutional set-up (in addition to the pair-wise comparisons 
of the various programmes) is the average effect of joining a given programme compared to 
further postponing the participation decision by not joining any programme at least up to 
then. 
The aim of the paper thus consists in quantifying the differential effectiveness on subse-
quent labour market performance (e.g. employment probability over time) of seven differ-
ent types of treatments: labour market training, work experience, job introduction, relief 
work, trainee replacement, job subsidies and searching longer in open unemployment.  
 
Implementation 
In Section 4.1 both the identification conditions and the balancing scores have been defined 
just taking account of the two sub-samples participating in the two treatments which are the 
object of a given comparison, de facto ignoring the multi-programme nature of the envi-
ronment the individuals face. As Lechner (2001) clearly points out, when interested in com-
paring two programmes for participants in one of those two, the existence of multiple 
treatments can in fact be ignored, since individuals who do not take part in either pro-
gramme considered are not needed for identification.  
However, considerable attention should be devoted to the specification of the treatment 
probabilities, and it is in fact their estimation which offers an opportunity to capture and 
take account of the multiplicity of options open to individuals.  
In the Swedish context in particular, it was argued above that it is also important to 
model the month-by-month decision-making process of the individual/caseworker. A way  20
to accomplish this is to model the effect of unemployment duration (as well as of both fixed 
and time-varying characteristics) on the various options open to an individual at any given 
point of time. In particular, all our individuals start by registering as (first-time) unem-
ployed. At any given point U=u in their first unemployment spell (our empirical units will 
be months), they can ‘decide’ between a set of 11 exhaustive and mutually exclusive op-
tions: to participate in one of the six available programmes, to continue searching for a job 
full-time as openly unemployed, to find (or decide to accept) a job, to go on education in 
the regular system, to leave the labour force through another channel, or to drop out of the 
unemployment register for reasons unknown to the officials. By modelling the effect of un-
employment duration on exit type, one can thus simultaneously take account of the various 
exit routes from unemployment, of right-censoring and of the effect of time-varying charac-
teristics on individual choices. 
As to the practical implementation, each single individual unemployment spell of a 
given number of days is split into monthly spells. Each of these new sub-spells is character-
ised by the duration month u the new sub-spell refers to, by a corresponding treatment indi-
cator and by those characteristics pertaining to, and events taking place during that u
th 
month of unemployment. The conditional probability of choosing option k after having 
spent U months in unemployment, P(Ti=k | Ui, Xi), is then estimated
29 and the correspond-
ing balancing scores constructed. Since our interest in the estimation of the balancing score 
purely lies in its ability to balance the characteristics of the matched sub-groups being pair-
wisely compared, this criterion has guided the choice, for each pair-wise comparison, of 
which specification to use as a basis for matching.
30 
                                                 
29 The conditioning set of observables X denotes fixed individual characteristics as well as time-varying char-
acteristics both of the individual and of the macro local conditions he faces. Time-varying observables other 
than elapsed unemployment duration U are defined conditional on Ui or on calendar time, and include two 
main sets of controls: those relating to the unemployment experience of the individual so far (i.e. up to U=u) 
and those capturing the local conditions prevailing at U=u at the employment office of the individual. A thor-
ough discussion of the conditioning variables is deferred to the next sub-section. 
30 See TableA1 in the Appendix for the definition of the indicators used to assess matching quality, as well as 
for the final choice of specification for each pair-wise comparison. Specifications which have been tried are: 
multinomial logit on the full set of exits, on an aggregation of some of them; a series of binomial probits; Ma-
halanobis-metric matching on the balancing score and unemployment duration if the latter resulted unsatisfac-
torily balanced; Mahalanobis-metric matching on both participation probabilities in the case of the multino-
mial logit; imposing a caliper (i.e. a maximum tolerable distance between the scores of a treated and his 
matched control) when differences in the matched scores were deemed excessive.  21
Matching estimators can be implemented in wide variety of ways
31; the analyses of this 
paper are based on one-to-one matching, performed with replacement. Since pair-wise 
comparisons are performed across all (differently-sized) sub-samples, each sub-group will 
act both as a treated group and as (several) comparison groups, entailing thus the need to 
use a given individual more than once in a given comparison. The variance has to be ad-
justed accordingly: the more times a comparison observation is used, the larger the related 
standard error of the estimated effect.
32 
To compare programme k and programme k’ for participants in programme k, each k-
participant is matched to that k’-participant based on the balancing score. The differential 
performance of the two matched groups then starts being evaluated from entry into the re-
spective programme. 
To estimate the average effect of joining a given programme k compared to waiting 
longer (than they have) for participants in programme k, the corresponding balancing score 
is calculated for each k-participant and each waiting spell. The procedure then follows 
closely the ‘stratification’ approach in Sianesi (2002a). In particular, k-participants and 
waiting individuals are stratified by unemployment duration U=1, 2, …, Umax(k). For a 
given unemployment duration U=u, those k-participants who enter the programme in their 
u
th month are matched to the most similar individuals who are still unemployed after u 
months. The evaluation of the average effect of joining programme k in one’s u
th month of 
unemployment compared to not joining any programme at least up to one’s u
th month (i.e. 
compared to waiting in open unemployment longer than u months) starts from entry into 
                                                 
31 See e.g. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997 and 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), De-
hejia and Wahba (1999), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), Cochran and Rubin (1973). 
32 The variance of conditional average effect of treatment k relative to treatment k’ at time t is calculated by 
assuming independent observations, fixed weights, homoskedasticity of the outcome variable within the k-
group and within the k’ comparison group and that the variance of the outcome does not depend on the bal-
ancing score (as to the latter, bootstrapping would have been performed if it had not been for the amount of 
computer time needed to estimate the multinomial model on such a large sample): 
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t N  is the number of matched treated k present at time t, T
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programme k, namely from U=u. Subsequently aggregating all the Umax(k) effects of pro-
gramme k by time of entry would then recover the average effect, for those observed to join 
programme k, of joining when they did compared to waiting longer than they have, where 
the average is taken with respect to the observed entry distribution into programme k.
33  
When interpreting the results on the effect of joining a given programme rather than 
waiting longer in open unemployment it is thus important to keep in mind that the chosen 
comparison group does not reflect a no-programme state, but rather a possibly postponed 
participation. In particular, the matched comparison group may turn out to partly consist of 
individuals enrolling into the same
34 or another programme later on. What is crucial to this 
end is that the CIA is satisfied in our case, namely that the probability distribution of sub-
sequent outcomes (employment, de-registration for other reasons or participation in the 
various programmes) for the then openly unemployed matched comparisons is the same as 
the one for the observably-similar treated individuals had they then decided to wait longer 
as well.  
 
4.3  Plausibility of the matching approach in the Swedish context 
The method just outlined relies on the central assumption that we observe – and thus can 
match on – all those differences between the various treatment groups that are likely to af-
fect their outcomes. The plausibility of the CIA should be discussed in relation to the rich-
ness of the available dataset as well as the selection process into the Swedish programmes. 
To this end it may be useful to separately consider:  
                                                 
33 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows our sample’s entry distribution into the six programmes by month in 
open unemployment. ALU and API stand somewhat apart in that entry is much more concentrated around the 
time of UI exhaustion. 
34 Note to this respect that a given treated individual may also turn out to act as control in the estimation of the 
effect of joining a given programme compared to waiting longer. In fact, the relative time scale, which is im-
plicit in the set-up of the problem and central in the way it has been addressed, makes it quite intuitive to 
think of him as different persons, whose contributions start at different origins. In particular, a given treated 
individual counts as one treated person, whose contribution starts being evaluated at the moment he enters the 
programme (i.e. from his U), and may count as control person for ‘otherwise similar’ treated individuals who 
have joined the same programme before him. In this latter case, under the CIA his outcome represents the 
waiting counterfactual outcome for his matched treated individuals, where evaluation begins when his 
matched treated enter the programme (i.e. from his matched treated individuals’ U).  23
(1) the decision between waiting further in open unemployment or joining a (i.e. any) pro-
gramme; 
(2) the decision to choose one specific programme among the available ones.  
As to decision (1), we need to control for all variables that, conditional on having spent a 
given amount of time in unemployment, influence both the decision to join a programme as 
well as potential future labour market performance were such decision to be postponed fur-
ther. From work by Harkman (2000, as reported in Carling and Richardson, 2001) it ap-
pears that an unemployed individual’s decision to participate in any programme or not to 
participate may depend on the individual’s subjective likelihood of employment. Although 
unobserved to us, we are however able to control for several factors which may be highly 
correlated with it. In particular, several pieces of information are used to capture and char-
acterise the employment history of the individuals under examination. All our individuals 
register at the unemployment office for their first time, so their only unemployment experi-
ence relates to the present unemployment spell. If – as it is likely – an individual takes his 
decisions over time spent in unemployment, controlling for elapsed unemployment duration 
should allow us to capture important unobservables (e.g. perceived deterioration of human 
capital, stigma effect, loss of hope or motivation, etc.). Similarly, all our individuals, being 
entitled to unemployment benefits, are also characterised by a good degree of labour market 
attachment due to the work requirement they have to fulfil.
35 Indicators of having run out of 
unemployment benefits or of benefits expiring have also been included, since such a situa-
tion would make an individual more likely to join a programme or, if having to wait longer, 
more likely to enter a programme later on or to intensify his job search (or lower his reser-
vation wage). Another important individual attribute is the pre-unemployment wage, a 
summary statistic of the worker’s past labour market situation.  
Similarly, we have controlled for factors relating both to employment prospects and ei-
ther to potential returns from programme participation or affecting the opportunity cost or 
psychological cost of participation (age, gender, previous stock of human capital in terms 
                                                 
35 An indicator of KAS entitlement controls for the additional way to fulfil the ‘work’ requirement.  24
of both specific and general education and job-specific experience
36, occupation being 
sought, citizenship, part-time unemployment status
37). 
The Swedish unemployment offices are characterised by decentralisation, which gives 
job officers quite a large degree of freedom. Also, although in general an unemployed job-
seeker must be willing to participate, this may not always apply to individuals receiving 
unemployment compensation; for them, the proposal of a programme can be used as a 
‘work test’, the turning down of which may entail suspension from benefits. To capture this 
selection by caseworkers, additional useful information has been included which relates to 
an overall evaluation by the officer of the situation and character of the unemployed job-
seeker – if already part-time employed, if looking for a part-time job, if willing to move to 
another locality, if judged to be able to take a job immediately, or to be in need of guidance, 
or to be difficult to place. Such individual traits are potential indicators of unobserved het-
erogeneity and are quite likely to affect the joining decision as well as the counterfactual 
outcomes in terms of subsequent participation or employment probability. An interesting 
piece of information in the Swedish dataset is an unemployment spell characterised by hav-
ing been offered a labour market programme. Having gone through the selection process 
and having been offered a place makes it more likely for the individual to join a programme 
rather than waiting; had he not joined now, he would be more likely to join later on or to 
decrease his job search in anticipation of joining. 
The possibility of anticipatory effects in terms of future employment would violate the 
CIA underlying the estimation of the joining versus waiting effects. In particular, if some 
unemployed workers know that their former employer is going to call them back (e.g. they 
are seasonal workers, or have a credible agreement with their employer allowing the tempo-
rarily dismissed employee to collect unemployment benefits), they are likely to have no (or  
                                                 
36 Difference in prior work experience is important since it results from both observed and unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics (cf. Ham and LaLonde, 1996). Our subjective indicator of experience for the profession 
sought (none, some, good) can be viewed as a summary statistic of the amount – as well as effectiveness, 
transferability and obsolescence – of previous human capital accumulation, on-the-job training and learning-
by-doing. 
37 Part-time unemployment spells denote individuals who are still maintaining contact with the regular labour 
market and are probably both subject to less human capital depreciation and in a better position to look for a 
(full-time) job, by exploiting their bargaining position, additional contacts and references.  25
less) incentives to participate in programmes at any given month in unemployment; at the 
same time, they are observed to actually find employment. Additional observables included 
to control for potential anticipatory effects of this kind include the occupation/skill type of 
the job-seeker, as well as the month of registration, which should help capture seasonal un-
employment. More generally, though, the CIA would be violated in the presence of hidden 
job offers, that is if an individual waiting longer has decided to do so because he knows that 
he will be hired shortly. How serious this issue is going to be in our case thus largely de-
pends on the typical time span between job offer and job commencement (and whether or 
not an individual who is going to start a job typically remains/is allowed to remain regis-
tered at the unemployment office in the meantime). 
Turning now to decision (2), i.e. the selection mechanism into the various programmes, 
the CIA requires the evaluator to have access to all the variables that influence both the 
choice between the programmes as well as potential future outcomes that would occur had 
the individual chosen an alternative programme. Note that all our individuals have access to 
the same choice set, the only relevant recommendation being the one requiring a certain 
length of the unemployment period prior to enrolment; benefit renewability rules and indi-
vidual compensation while on the programmes are similarly comparable across pro-
grammes.  
Harkman (2000) finds that while individual self-selection into different programmes is 
likely to be a minor issue in Sweden (unemployed workers tend to value the various pro-
grammes equally), the caseworkers do seem to have clear ideas about which type of pro-
gramme is suitable for their clients, based on individual characteristics. Since the relevant 
decision-maker thus appears to be the caseworker, the only issue we need to focus on is 
whether he acts upon information which is unobserved to us and correlated with labour 
market outcomes. We do however observe not only important characteristics of the unem-
ployed client, but also the caseworker’s own subjective and synthetic evaluation of the 
overall situation and needs of service of his unemployed client as described above. In a 
sense, the caseworker reveals and records in the data a synthetic appraisal of various fac-
tors, including some which may have been originally unobserved to us. Our assumption 
then translates into the requirement that conditional on all this information, programme as- 26
signment is unrelated to outcomes; caseworkers or employment offices act idiosyncratically 
given worker characteristics (based e.g. on their preferences, incentives, experiences, col-
leagues’ opinions). Carling and Richardson (2001), who carefully examine the factors that 
determine which programme the job seeker ends up joining, do in fact provide reassuring 
evidence that the administrative selection process appears to be unrelated to the outcome.
  
A final issue relates to the gradual shift towards more decentralised decision-making as 
to labour market programmes that has taken place in Sweden in the second half of the 
1990s and to the concomitant emergence of new financial incentives (cf. Lundin and Sked-
inger, 2000): municipal budgets may be favourably affected by moving unemployed indi-
viduals from social assistance (funded by the local authorities) to programmes (financed by 
the central government); some programmes (e.g. relief work) may subsidise labour in the 
services typically provided by the local authorities; and programmes may serve as a means 
of maintaining the local municipal tax base, by reducing migration among the unemployed. 
In addition to county indicators, a set of local indicators at the individual’s municipality / 
employment office level over time have thus been constructed to further control for the 
possibility that individual joining decisions and/or office-specific programme selection cri-
teria may be based on local unobserved characteristics in turn correlated with individuals’ 
potential labour market performance. Such controls include the local ‘programme-rate’, 
given by the share of registered unemployed job-seekers participating in any programme; 
the local ‘offer-rate’, representing the proportion of unemployed workers who have been 
offered a programme out of all openly unemployed; and a series of single programme ra-
tios, reflecting the programme mix at that office and at that time. 
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5.  Empirical findings 
In this section, differential programme effects and the effect of joining a given programme 
vis-à-vis waiting longer in unemployment are assessed in relation to two important out-
comes: individuals’ employment rates over time and the probability of being in a compen-
sated unemployment spell over time. 
5.1  Employment probability over time 
The effect of joining programme A (compared either to joining another programme or to 
searching longer in open unemployment) on the employment probability
38 of participants in 
programme A is calculated from the start of the programme to five years on and summa-
rises various components: a ‘lock-in’ effect, an effect on the probability of finding a job and 
an effect on job longevity.  
The differential lock-in effect of the programme vis-à-vis the comparison treatment 
originates from a differential job search while on the programme. Compared to open unem-
ployment, job search is clearly reduced because less time is left due to participation itself. 
Different programmes may however also differentially reduce the intensity of job search 
while participating in the respective programme: they may for instance leave different 
amounts of time and energy for job search or may entail different ‘promises’ once com-
pleted (e.g. employment subsidies may induce participants to focus on the job at hand to 
‘impress’ the employer in order to increase the likelihood to remain with the firm after-
wards). 
Differential treatment effects on job finding probabilities may originate from various 
channels: improved (e.g. via contacts and references from an employment programme) or 
more intense (e.g. while in full-time open unemployment) job-search; the acquisition of 
new marketable skills making the working option more attractive and/or the individual 
more in demand (e.g. via training); and the revelation of previously unknown individual 
productivity to temporary or potential employers.  
                                                 
38 An individual counts as employed if registered at the unemployment office as employed (e.g. temporary or 
looking for a new job) or if de-registered for having found employment.  28
Finally, a differential degree of job longevity may be the result of the different extent to 
which the programmes improve the individual’s working habits, skills, adaptability or abil-
ity to learn on the job. 
As to the effect from participating in a given programme compared to longer job-search 
as openly unemployed, all the programmes considered are found to have a negative impact 
on their respective participants’ short-term employment prospects. As shown in Figure 5.1, 
joining any of these programmes initially locks participants in, reducing their chances of 
being in employment by an over 15 percent probability in each case. However, the more 
long-term effect of joining a programme is found to critically depend on the type of pro-
gramme the individual has entered. In particular, for our sample of entitled adult unem-
ployed workers it seems more worthwhile to intensively search longer in open unemploy-
ment rather than joining labour market training, ALU or relief work. Even after the pro-
gramme typically ends, these participants subsequently enjoy lower employment rates than 
if they had postponed the joining decision further. These negative effects persist over a sub-
stantial time horizon before turning insignificant (around one and a half years in the case of 
training, almost three years for ALU and over four and a half years for relief work). A pos-
sible explanation, to be explored below, is that these programmes may not provide partici-
pants −  and especially participants entitled to unemployment benefit −  with skills market-
able enough to make the working option sufficiently attractive; these programmes may thus 
end up being typically used by entitled individuals simply as a passport to renewed eligibil-
ity.  
Participants in API and in trainee replacement on the other hand are just as well off as if 
they had waited longer. By contrast, the decision to join a job subsidy programme rather 
than searching further in open unemployment results in significantly and persistently higher 
employment rates (up to 40 percentage points) soon after the programme typically ends. 
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Figure 5.1 Average effect on employment probability over time of joining the specified 
programme compared to waiting longer in open unemployment for participants in the speci-
fied programme 
Labour market training 
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Notes:   Time in months, from programme start.  95% confidence intervals bands. 
a Employment probability obviously refers to a regular (i.e. non-subsidised) job.  30
Table 5.1 summarises the above results as well as the main picture that emerges from the 
series of graphs plotting the differential programme effects on employment probability over 
time for all the pair-wise comparisons of the programmes.
39 Note that although later in the 
section ALU and API will be explicitly contrasted, in the table and the following discussion 
these two programmes centred on work experience have been lumped into one type of 
treatment, ‘work practice’. The two measures have in fact a very similar overall aim, nature 
and implementation (in particular the requirement of not performing regular tasks), this at 
least formal equivalence having being sanctioned by the employment offices themselves in 
January 1999, when the two measures were collapsed into the new work practice scheme. 
ALU’s additional eligibility requirement is also not binding in our sample of unemploy-
ment-benefit entitled individuals. 
 
Table 5.1 Informal summary of the various conditional average treatment effects on em-
ployment probability over 5-year horizon since programme start  
Comparison ↓   Training  Work practice
a Relief Replacement  Subsidies 
Waiting   lock-in 
 negative    
   up to 30m 
 then 0 
 lock-in, 
 negative  
   up to 30m   
   for ALU only 
 then 0 
 lock-in 
 then  
   negative 
 lock-in 
 then 0 
 short lock-
   in 
 then large  
   positive 







0   mostly  0 
 
positive large  positive
Relief 0 0   mostly  0 
positive up to 15m 
large positive
Replacement negative  then 
zero from 30m 
negative  0 
(neg. but insig-
nificant at 95%)
 large  positive
Subsidies  large negative  large negative  large negative mostly negative   
Notes: This summary takes informal account of the statistical significance of the estimated effects; for the 
complete set of results, see the Appendix. 
m = month(s). 
a ALU and API combined. 
 
 
                                                 
39 See the Appendix for the full set of results.  31
Turning to the results concerning the relative performance of the different programmes, 
both a priori expectations and the general picture arising from the raw data appear to be 
confirmed. The star programme is again clearly job subsidies – not surprisingly, given the 
job promise they generally entail. Individuals having joined this programme enjoy a much 
higher (20 to 40 percentage points) employment probability over time than if they had 
joined an alternative programme. In addition, participants in any of these other programmes 
(with the possible exception of trainee replacement schemes) would have fared considera-
bly better had they gone on job subsidies instead. The second best performing programme 
is confirmed to be trainee replacement. Since the task performed is by construction a useful 
one, for which the firm was willing to pay a regular employee, the presumption that this 
programme should teach market-relevant skills is corroborated by the result that former 
deputies have considerably better outcomes than if they had joined any other of the remain-
ing programmes (in particular, training or work practice). Conversely, trainees and work 
practice participants would have improved their labour market performance had they joined 
a replacement scheme. As to the remaining programmes – labour market training, work 
practice and relief work, they do not seem to perform much differently from one another.  
5.2  Unemployment-benefit collection probability over time 
Since we are looking at individuals who are entitled to unemployment benefits and for 
whom the eligibility-renewability property of the programmes is likely to represent a par-
ticularly attractive feature likely to affect incentives, we additionally consider the differen-
tial treatment effects on the probability of being effectively drawing unemployment com-
pensation over time.
40  
The performance of job subsidy participants stands out again: they are significantly less 
likely to be on unemployment benefits over time than if they had participated in any other 
programme, and participants in the other programmes would have been less likely to be 
drawing benefits over time had they gone on a subsidised job, the only exception again be-
ing replacement schemes, participants in which do not seem to perform substantially differ-
                                                 
40 The results are displayed in the Appendix.  32
ently in this dimension than if they had gone on subsidised jobs.
41 What is even more strik-
ing is the negative, mostly significant effect on the likelihood of compensated unemploy-
ment of joining employment subsidies compared to waiting longer in open unemployment.  
In fact, employment subsidies is the only programme to display a negative effect on 
benefit collection probability compared to postponing the participation decision. While re-
placement schemes have a zero effect beyond the initial five months
42, participants in train-
ing, API, ALU and relief work all have a significantly higher likelihood of compensated 
unemployment over time than if they had waited longer in unemployment −  clear evidence 
in favour of the likely role played by benefit renewability considerations in the above find-
ing of a negative treatment effect on employment rates displayed by these latter measures. 
Coming back to the pair-wise comparison of the programmes in terms of compensated 
unemployment probability, replacement schemes have a negative effect compared to train-
ing, but no effect compared to the other programmes. Conversely, participants in training, 
work practice and relief work would have been less likely to be in compensated unem-
ployment had they joined a replacement scheme instead. Again, these three kinds of pro-
gramme do not perform significantly differently from one another in terms of benefit col-
lection probability. Interestingly, in the case of relief work and especially work practice 
participants, clear evidence of unemployment-programme ‘cycling’ effects is visible, with 
significant positive effects (compared both to some other programmes and especially to the 
waiting longer option) arising between the 6
th and 20
th month (i.e. after programme end and 
up to the maximum 14 months of compensated unemployment), and often between the 27
th 
and 38
th month (a second cycling spell, starting from the end of a second programme). 
5.3  API versus ALU 
As to the two work practice measures, their potentially different effectiveness is of particu-
lar interest, since while sharing the basic features of API, ALU is exclusively reserved to 
individuals entitled to unemployment benefits and has been explicitly introduced to prevent  
                                                 
41 The initial positive effect from start of the replacement programme to up to 5 months reflects the fewer di-
rect programme-employment transitions that deputies experience compared to subsidised workers. 
42 By construction, individuals do not draw unemployment compensation while on the programme.  33
them from running out of compensation. In terms of employment probability over time, 
while participants in one of the two programmes would not have fared better had they 
joined the other programme instead (Figure 5.2A), compared to waiting longer in open un-
employment the performance of ALU is visibly worse than the one of API (Figure 5.1). In 
addition, ALU participants are somewhat more likely to be drawing benefits on a ‘cycling’ 
basis compared to waiting longer than do API participants had they waited longer too (see 
the clearly delineated second hump
43 for ALU in Figure 5.2B). Thus even when condition-
ing on unemployed individuals entitled to benefits, there seems to be scope for the explicit, 
close link between entitlement renewability and programme (as institutionalised in the case 
of ALU) to impact on the programme’s effectiveness on the labour market performance of 
its participants.
44 
Figure 5.2  Differential performance of ALU and API 
(A) Average effect on employment probability over time of joining 
 ALU compared to API for ALU participants 
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API compared to ALU for API participants 
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(B) Average effect on benefit collection probability over time of joining the specified pro-
























Notes: Time in months, from programme start.  95% confidence intervals bands. 
                                                 
43 From the 27
th (≈ 6+14+6) to the 40
th (≈ 27+14) month. 
44 For more analyses of the linkages between entitlement, programme participation, benefit exhaustion and 
‘cycling’ behaviour, see Sianesi (2002a and b).  34
5.4  The problem of the ‘lost’ individuals  
A final issue concerns an attrition problem in the Händel dataset, whereby a registered un-
employed individual, having first missed an appointment at the official employment office 
and subsequently failing to contact the agency within a week, is simply de-registered – thus 
lost from the data – without information on whether a job has been found or whether the 
individual is still unemployed. Bring and Carling (2000), who have tried to trace back a 
sample of ‘lost’ individuals, have found that around half of them had in fact found a job, 
highlighting how seriously under-reported employment status is in the official data. More 
critically, though, it is quite possible that the probability of being in a lost spell over time, 
as well as the true status (employed versus unofficially unemployed) once in a lost spell 
may be systematically different among individuals taking the various treatments, i.e. enter-
ing one of the available programmes or searching longer in open unemployment. Although 
in our sample of entitled individuals this attrition problem is considerably less severe than 
in the full sample, almost 9% of our individuals do become ‘lost’ after their first (regis-
tered) unemployment spell (see Table 3.2), while the probability of being lost over time 
steadily rises to 12% over our 5-year horizon. It would thus seem important to check the 
robustness against these lost spells of the findings on employment rates.  
Following Sianesi (2002a)
45, the additional information from the Bring and Carling sur-
vey has been exploited to perform best- and worst-case bounds analysis on all the pair-wise 
comparisons of the treatments. As shown in the Appendix (Figure A12, to be contrasted 
with Figure 5.1 above)
46, the conclusions discussed above remain in fact virtually unaf-
fected, in particular regarding the positive employment effect of job subsidies and the nega-
tive ones of relief work, ALU and training. 
                                                 
45 The conditional probability that a lost individual (L=1) with characteristics X has in reality found employ-
ment (Y=1) can be decomposed as: P(Y=1|X=x, L=1)=P(Y=1|X=x, L=1, D=1) P(D=1|X=x, L=1)+P(Y=1|X=x, 
L=1, D=0) [1–P(D=1|X=x, L=1)], where for each pair-wise treatment comparison, D=1 denotes the treatment 
and D=0 the comparison treatment. For each lost individual, we know his treatment status D, we can estimate 
his treatment probability given the lost status P(D=1|Xi, Li=1)≡ p
D
i and based on the survey we can impute his 
misclassification probability P(Yi=1|Xi, Li=1)≡  p
Y
i. 
The procedure to derive worst- and best-case bounds consists in assigning P(Yi=1|Xi, Li=1, D=di) by setting 




i, as well as with 
all probabilities being in [0; 1]. 
46 The full set of results is available from the author upon request.  35
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
The analyses in this paper have investigated the differential performance of six main types 
of Swedish programmes both relative to one another and vis-à-vis more intense job search 
in open unemployment.  
Starting from this latter comparison, the results concerning programme effects on em-
ployment and compensated unemployment have been discouraging for all the programmes 
considered except job subsidies (and possibly replacement schemes).  
Several factors (in addition to a possible violation of the identifying assumption underly-
ing the method chosen for analysis) may account for such disappointing findings. It might 
for instance be more difficult to put participants back into stable work in periods of high 
unemployment
47 (though it may be argued that it is exactly in such difficult times when ef-
fective labour market programmes would be most needed). There is also the connected is-
sue of the scale of the programmes; the massive use of large-scale programmes in the 1990s 
is likely to have resulted in inefficient programme administration.
48  
An additional most likely explanation however relates to the use of the programmes 
simply as a way to re-qualify for unemployment benefits, with programmes ending up lock-
ing their participants – and in particular those entitled to unemployment compensation – in 
the unemployment system. 
In fact, when looking at these six programmes taken as a whole compared to waiting 
longer in open unemployment, the results – both in terms of employment rates and of bene-
fit collection probability over time – for the sub-sample of entitled adults considered here 
are considerably worse than those obtained for the sub-sample of adults not entitled to un-
employment benefits (cf. Sianesi, 2002b).
49 Contrasting these two sets of results would thus  
                                                 
47 See e.g. the switch from positive effects for Swedish labour market training in the 1980s to negative ones in 
the 1990s. For more details, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001). 
48 In principle there could also be a stigma effect linked to participation in these programmes; this is however 
not confirmed by Swedish evidence, according to which employers view former programme participants more 
favourably than openly unemployed individuals. For a review of the relevant survey studies, see Calmfors, 
Forslund and Hemström (2001). 
49 In particular, joining one of the six programmes (rather than waiting longer in open unemployment) has a 
persistently negative employment effect for the entitled, but a significant and substantial positive effect for the 
non-entitled.  36
lend support to the conjecture that for individuals entitled to unemployment compensation, 
the eligibility renewability rules are likely to significantly distort the incentives for partici-
pation and thus wipe out potential productivity-enhancing effects of several programmes.  
In particular, the present analysis has found that individuals joining labour market train-
ing, workplace practice schemes or relief work subsequently display lower employment 
rates coupled with a higher benefit collection probability than if they had searched further 
as openly unemployed. 
As to the pair-wise comparison of the effectiveness of the six programmes, it is interest-
ing to start by considering the work by Carling and Richardson (2001), a Swedish study 
most similar in aim and sample selection
50 to the present one. The present study can be seen 
as a ‘robustness’ analysis (using a different methodology from their hazard regression 
model), as well as complementing the previous one, in which programmes are evaluated 
along one dimension: their ability to reduce unemployment duration (measured from start 
of the programme), thus ignoring what happens once a job is found.
51  
It is thus both reassuring and interesting to notice how their main finding is confirmed in 
our analyses looking at further types of outcomes. Those programmes providing (subsi-
dised) workplace experience and on-the-job training at an employer are relatively more ef-
fective in terms of participants’ subsequent labour market performance than vocational 
classroom training courses. In addition, the more relevant the kind of task performed, the 
higher the programme ranks. More specifically, the top six programmes (from the eight) 
emerging from their results in term of unemployment duration (cf. their Table 3) are: 1. job 
subsidies, 2. trainee replacement, 3. work practice (API), 4. labour market training, 5. relief 
work and 6. work practice (ALU). 
                                                 
50 They examine the relative efficiency of eight Swedish programmes – the same six programmes examined 
here plus self-employment grants and computer/activity centres – for adult unemployed becoming unem-
ployed for their first time in slightly later years than ours (between 1995 and 1997). 
51 They also do not consider the impact of the option of intensive job search in open unemployment, and thus 
do not investigate whether participation in any programme is better or worse than postponing the participation 
decision. On the other hand, they examine (providing a negative answer) the issue of whether the pro-
grammes’ relative efficiency is affected by how long an individual has been unemployed before joining, or if 
it depends on participants’ demographics and skills.  37
Even more generally, the underlying similarity of results across studies looking at differ-
ent countries with varying labour market structures and policies may indicate a general va-
lidity of the overall conclusions.
52 
Coming back to the present evaluation, the best performer overall is undisputedly em-
ployment subsidies, followed by trainee replacement. As to the remaining types of pro-
grammes, they do not seem to perform in a significantly different way between one another.  
Turning to the cost side, it is quite remarkable to notice how the ranking of the pro-
grammes in terms of their effectiveness is almost perfectly reversed when taken in terms of 
their expensiveness (1. labour market training, 2. ALU, 3. relief work, 4. trainee replace-
ment, 5. API and 6. job subsidies). 
It is however important not to jump at the hasty conclusion that employment subsidies 
are the solution – the most effective programme as well as the cheapest. Several types of 
issues can be raised to point out potential problems both in terms of the effective magnitude 
of the uncovered effects and in terms of their general applicability should the scope of the 
programme be extended.  
As to the scope of the analysis, it is important to bear in mind that the programme’s ef-
fects have been evaluated for a rather specific sub-group of the population – the declared 
target group of individuals who have been relatively long in unemployment (although note 
that Carling and Richardson (2001) find their results unaffected by time spent in unem-
ployment prior to participation).  
A second issue concerns the validity of the identifying CIA assumption for participants 
in this programme: since job subsidies generally entail the ‘promise’ of a job, it is likely 
that potential candidates are considered quite carefully. Even though we control for a host 
of factors likely to underlie the case-worker’s judgement and despite Carling and Richard-
son’s (2001) finding of no selection bias for this programme, it may still be the case that 
subsidised participants are slightly ‘better’ on average than matched comparisons. Nonethe-
less, it would be hard to argue that selection bias (also possibly in the form of anticipatory 
                                                 
52 For a summary of other Swedish evidence in line with the present results, see the review by Calmfors, Fors-
lund and Hemström (2001). For OECD countries see the review by Martin and Grubb (2001) and e.g. Gerfin 
and Lechner (2000) for Switzerland, Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2000) and Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon 
(1997) for France, and Ridder (1986) for the Netherlands.  38
effects) could account for all of the large positive effects seemingly displayed by job subsi-
dies in terms of all comparisons and outcomes considered. 
Even if the direction of the estimated effects may appear reliable, however, it may not be 
possible or even desirable to focus attention and funds on this kind of measure. As to the 
sheer possibility of extending it, scope is in fact limited: the public sector cannot use such 
grants, and following EU regulations in 1997 neither do employers in the synthetic fibre, 
automotive, steel, shipyard, fishery and transport industries. 
Apart from legal feasibility, the desirability of a widespread use of this measure may not 
be warranted once it is considered that our estimates ignore potential indirect and general 
equilibrium effects which may spill over to other groups. In particular, substitution would 
take place if participants in the employment subsidy programme were to take (some of) the 
jobs that participants in the other programmes or ‘waiting’ unemployed individuals would 
have been offered in the absence of the subsidies. The impact of the subsidy would thus be 
at the expense of worsened conditions either for participants in the other programmes or for 
openly unemployed individuals finding it more difficult to get jobs or getting worse jobs. 
The estimated effect would in this case overestimate the net impact of the subsidy pro-
gramme. Both survey and econometric Swedish studies do in fact find sizeable (around 65-
70 percent) direct displacement effects arising from those Swedish programmes that gener-
ate subsidised employment.
53 
Finally, it is obviously unthinkable to generalise such a measure to all unemployed job-
seekers: it would simply become just a way to subsidise firms’ hirings, resulting in huge 
dead-weight effects (i.e. subsidising hiring that would have taken place anyway). 
In the light of the present and previous results and of the above considerations, a more 
promising measure might appear to be trainee replacement schemes. Still among the cheap-
est programmes, it was shown to perform quite satisfactorily. In fact, it shares some of the 
features likely to be at the root of the success of job subsidies (short of the job promise): in 
terms of the present temporary employment, it provides relevant job-specific training and 
can be used as a cheap screening device of individual unobserved productivity. At the same  
                                                 
53 For more details, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001).  39
time it sends out a message that the individual has been gaining (or maintaining) relevant 
skills, thus making the job seeker more attractive to potential future employers, who value 
the fact that a job is being performed in the regular competitive market. Finally, our partial-
equilibrium estimates are likely to be an underestimate of the programme’s effect, since 
they do not take into account the ‘double-dividend’ effect arising from the possibility of-
fered to the replaced employees of increasing their human capital through training. 
Nevertheless, even though at first sight the potential of this programme appears particu-
larly promising, a few issues need once again to be considered. The ‘double-dividend’ from 
the subsidised training of the replaced employee may in fact often turn out to be dead-
weight loss instead
54, while Harkman, Johansson and Okeke (1999) found evidence of 
dead-weight in terms of the deputies as well, with a large share of participants alternating 
between regular short-term jobs and trainee replacement with the same employer. Finally, 
survey studies have in fact uncovered displacement effects of the same order as employ-
ment subsidies (e.g. AMS, 1998).
55   
In conclusion, the present analysis unambiguously joins previous micro studies in find-
ing that the closer to regular, relevant employment in the competitive labour market, the 
higher the programme’s benefits to its participants. It is however essential to consider these 
findings in the light of those arising from the macroeconomic literature, which has widely 
documented that exactly for these types of programmes the potential for negative crowding-
out and dead-weight effects is largest. Taken together
56, the various results clearly highlight 
the difficult trade off faced by labour market policy. 
                                                 
54 Since 80 to 90 percent of employers taking part in the scheme are within sectors (health care and related 
branches in the public sector) with a long-standing system for further training funded by the employer, it 
seems likely that a good part of the sponsored training would have occurred anyway. (I thank Anders Hark-
man for this information.) 
55 42 percent as an average across survey studies, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001). 
56 See in particular Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001).  40
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Appendix 
Table A1: Specification chosen and indicators of resulting matching quality 
Treated  Comparisons  Specification  Median bias  Bias in U
  
training  waiting  MNL, all states  1.85   –  
experience  waiting  MNL, all states  2.12   –  
introduction  waiting  MNL, all states  3.30   –  
relief  waiting  MNL, all states  2.55   –  
replacement  waiting  MNL, all states  2.35   –  
subsidy  waiting  Probit  3.07   –  
   
training  work practice  Probit, finer on U  3.90  0.41
training relief  MNL,  all  states  6.57  3.58
training  replacement  Probit, finer on U  5.55  2.77
training  subsidy  Probit, finer on U  7.98  2.74
work practice  training  Probit, finer on U  4.20  0.73
work practice  relief  MNL, fewer states  4.86  1.78
work practice  replacement  Probit, finer on U  6.08  2.63
work practice  subsidy  Probit, finer on U  4.67  1.04
relief  training  Probit, finer on U  3.16  1.48
relief  work practice  Probit, finer on U  2.79  0.09
relief replacement  Probit  7.00  1.36
relief  subsidy  MNL, all states, finer on U 7.83  3.22
replacement  training  Probit, finer on U  4.18  0.06
replacement  work practice  Probit, finer on U  5.26  0.98
replacement  relief  Probit, finer on U  11.16  1.53
replacement subsidy  Probit  9.85  5.17
subsidy  training  Probit, finer on U  3.14  1.18
subsidy  work practice  Probit, finer on U  3.40  0.66
subsidy  relief  Probit, finer on U  6.14  0.29
subsidy  replacement  MNL, all states, finer on U 9.29  0.93
   
experience  introduction  MNL, all states, finer on U 10.87  2.5
introduction  experience  MNL, all states, finer on U 4.36  0.31
 
Notes: MNL: multinomial logit model. Finer on U: Mahalanobis-metric matching on the balancing score b 
and unemployment duration U, defined for individual i and individual j as d(i,j) =  (Pi – Pj)’ S
-1 (Pi – Pj), with 
Pm= [bm, Um]’ and  S the pooled within-sample covariance matrix of P. 
Median bias: median overall absolute percentage bias, where the median is taken over the post-matching ab-
solute standardised differences of 70 variables in estimation of the choice model (the various programme rates 
are excluded from calculation of the median). For a given regressor, the standardised difference after match-
ing is defined as the difference of the sample means in the treated and matched comparison sub-samples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and comparison groups (cf. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).  44


















Differential average effects on employment probability over time of the specified pro-
gramme compared to the various alternatives for participants in the specified programme.  
(percentage points; e.g. 0.2 is a 20 percentage points higher probability; 
t-axis: months since joining the programme) 
Figure A2: TRAINING compared to … for individuals taking training  
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Figure A3: WORK EXPERIENCE compared to … for individuals taking work experience  
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Figure A4: RELIEF compared to … for individuals taking relief  
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Figure A5: REPLACEMENT compared to … for individuals taking replacement  
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Figure A6: SUBSIDIES compared to … for individuals taking subsidies  
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Differential average effects on compensated unemployment probability over time of the 
specified programme compared to the various alternatives for participants in the specified 
programme.  
 
(percentage points; t-axis: months since joining the programme) 
 
Figure A7: TRAINING compared to … for individuals taking training  
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Figure A8: WORK EXPERIENCE compared to … for individuals taking work experience  
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Note: See Figure 5.2 in the main text for the effect of the two work practice schemes com-
pared to waiting longer.  49
Figure A9: RELIEF compared to … for individuals taking relief  
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Figure A10: REPLACEMENT compared to … for individuals taking replacement  
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Figure A11: SUBSIDIES compared to … for individuals taking subsidies  
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Figure A12 Average effect on employment probability over time of joining the specified 
programme compared to waiting longer in open unemployment for participants in the speci-
fied programme: estimated effect and best- and worst- case bounds 
(Time in months, from programme start)  
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